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 Foreword
Since the year 2000, the Telders Lecture is organized by the Telders Foun-
dation, the think tank that carries out research for the benefit of liberalism 
in general and for the Dutch Liberal Party VVD in particular. The Telders 
Foundation publishes books with the results of its research, and it organis-
es meetings: conferences, seminars, an annual liberal summer school, and 
a regular Telders Lecture. The purpose of this lecture is to stimulate public 
debate in the Netherlands by inviting a leading scholar or politician to 
provide us with profound, well-based ideas and insights. The lectures may 
cover a broad spectrum of relevant issues concerning science and politics.
The Telders Foundation organises the lecture regularly as a tribute to Pro-
fessor B.M. Telders after whom the foundation is named. During his short 
life (1903-1945), Professor Telders was highly respected in various capaci-
ties: as a lawyer, a philosopher and as a liberal politician. This combina-
tion of science and politics is also very characteristic for the Telders Lec-
tures. Professor Telders showed great courage as a politician throughout 
the German occupation of the Netherlands during World War II and it was 
this courage that eventually cost him his life. He died of typhus in the 
Bergen-Belsen concentration camp, just a few days before the camp was 
liberated by the Allied forces.
The first lecture, in November 2000, was on the ‘new economy’. Unlikely 
as it may now seem, at the turn of the century the idea had become widely 
popular that we had reached a modern, completely different economy, one 
without the usual detriments like inflation, unemployment and reces-
sion; let alone an economic depression. In that first Telders Lecture, al-
most eight-and-a-half years ago, Gerrit Zalm – then the liberal vice Prime 
Minister and Minister of Finance in the Netherlands – punctured this ‘new 
economy’-balloon. Subsequent Telders Lectures have dealt, amongst oth-
ers, with the influence of mass culture on the future of liberal democracy 
and with the future of European integration from a classical liberal per-
spective.
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Tonight, our guest is Orlando Figes, a notorious Professor of History at 
Birkbeck College, University of London. Figes is famous for his well-doc-
umented books on Russian history, in particular:
- A People’s Tragedy: The Russian Revolution, 1891-1924
- Natasha’s Dance: A Cultural History of Russia
- The Whisperers: Private Life in Stalin’s Russia
All of these three books have been translated in many languages, including 
Dutch. What probably strikes every reader of Professor Figes’ last book, 
The Whisperers, besides all the horrors he describes, is that in Stalin’s 
Russia there hardly wás any private life at all. As Professor Figes makes 
abundantly clear, this certainly was no coincidence. The state’s invasion 
of the private lives of its citizens, was the product of a deliberate policy of 
the communist leadership from Lenin on, to destroy every form of indi-
vidualism as well as every aspect of family life. The state’s pervasiveness 
was not uncommon for Russians – indeed, the communists elaborated on 
a tradition of anti-individuality and brutality in the country – but in a per-
verse way the communist leadership took this tradition to its extremes.
Like in so many other aspects, in operating thus they showed that com-
munism is the very opposite of liberalism. Liberals typically do not en-
tertain any Utopia’s, but Soviet Russia provided them with a convincing 
Anti-Utopia. After all, for liberals the ultimate political goal is the pursuit 
of the largest feasible freedom of individuals. Liberals deem a private life 
for an individual and his or her family, to be of the utmost importance, 
and therefore they display a due – I would almost say: ‘holy’ – respect for a 
private sphere in which the individual is free from public interference. For 
Lenin, Stalin, and their successors – on the contrary – trampling private 
lives of individuals and families was vital to establish the victory of com-
munism.
In the end, fortunately, communism did not triumph in Russia. But the 
question remains what damage has been done to Russian society by more 
than seven decades of communism. Will the dark spots that have been 
left by the ruthless policies of Lenin and Stalin, ever be erased? Or is it 
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not feasible that one of the future Russian leaders will ever have even the 
intention to make a clean sweep? What about Putin’s policies to strangle 
the rule of law and democracy and to reassert Russian claims in the world 
with an assertive foreign policy? Are these to be considered as almost in-
evitable outcomes of history? And how should we in the West deal with 
the new Russia, haunted by the ghost of Stalin? Very few people would be 
more fitted to shed an authoritative light on such questions as Professor 
Orlando Figes.
The Board of the Telders Foundation
Prof.mr.dr. F. Bolkestein, March 2009
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Stalin’s Ghost: the Legacies of Soviet History 
and the Future of Russia
Orlando Figes
Tomorrow, 5 March 2009, is the 56th anniversary of Stalin’s death. He 
died on the fifth of March 1953. Stalin is dead, but the ghost of Stalin is 
still alive. In fact it is more alive now than probably at any other time in 
the last fifty years. He is very much alive as a political figure. There is a 
popular nostalgia for Stalin at the moment. A very positive image of Sta-
lin is being presented in the mass media in Russia. According to a survey 
in 2005 42% of the Russian people and 60% of those over the age of 60 
wanted the return of a leader like Stalin. You could say they got what they 
wanted: mister Putin.
Putin is rehabilitating the image of Stalin. No one near the Kremlin or 
the Russian government is trying to deny Stalin’s crimes – that would be 
too difficult: by conservative estimates 25 million people were repressed. 
By which is meant: people executed, sentenced to the Gulag, deported as 
members of nationalities, people sent to administrative exile. To deny 25 
million people’s repression would be difficult. What the regime is doing 
is emphasizing Stalin’s so-called positive achievements – building a great 
country, the Soviet Union, winning the war against Hitler. This is obvi-
ously an alarming development.
This lecture poses the question how this could have happened. How es-
pecially could it have happened after the victory of the so-called Russian 
democracy in the 1990s? How could it have happened after the collapse of 
the Soviet system so recently in 1991, after a decade in which the Russians 
were supposedly denouncing their violent past? And what does this reha-
bilitation of Stalin mean for the future of Russia? So the story of tonight is 
not the story of Stalin as such or the story of the people who lived under 
Stalin, which is the story of The Whisperers. Here will be told the story of 
Stalin’s afterlife. The story of Stalin’s ghost. 
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After his death there was a great outpouring of mass grief. What were that 
grief and the scenes of mass hysteria about? Throughout this evening’s 
lecture I will draw from the project that I carried out for The Whisperers. 
That was a large-scale oral history project conducted between 2003 and 
2006 with the Memorial society.
The Memorial organization began in the late 1980s as a human rights and 
historical research centre to represent the victims of oppression in the So-
viet Union. Memorial carried out many oral history projects, helped victims 
of oppression trace missing relatives by representing their interests and ap-
plying for documents from the KGB archives. It is a civic organization. It has 
got commemoratives, statues and plates put up at sites of mass repression 
and in city centres to mark the destination of the Soviet population.
For the oral history project – which recovered from private homes across 
Russia several hundred family archives – over a thousand interviews with 
people who were survivors of the Stalinist system were conducted. Among 
the questions asked to everyone, because it was the one thing people could 
remember, was: what were you doing the day that Stalin died? His death 
was announced the sixth of March 1953. Until the funeral three days later 
his body lay in state in the Hall of Columns near the Red Square. And 
that is where you got – what you might have in your mind now – a huge 
crowd to file past the body to pay respect, and the massive crush of people 
outside the Hall of Columns wanting to see their Great Leader. We do not 
know how many, but well over a hundred people were killed in the crush. 
In a way those were perhaps some of his last victims.
How are we going to explain this hysteria? Many talk about people with 
floods of tears. Was this genuine love of Stalin or was it a release of emo-
tion, some sort of catharsis? Someone who had a good close-up view is the 
writer Konstantin Simonov, who features prominently in The Whisperers. 
I worked with his families archive. Simonov was Stalin’s favourite writer. 
He stood guard over Stalin’s body, so he saw people filing past from close 
range. He wrote in his diary on the sixteenth of March: ‘I do not know 
how to give an accurate description of the scene – or even how to put 
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it into words. Not everybody cried, not everybody sobbed, but somehow 
everybody showed some deep emotion. I could sense a kind of spiritual 
convulsion inside every person filing past at the very moment they first 
saw Stalin in his coffin.’
Now lots of people undoubtedly did grief at Stalin’s death, and they were 
not just Stalinists. There were many victims of oppression who grieved 
at his death. Mark Laskin, who is a relative of Simonov’s, certainly had 
no reason to love Stalin: his whole family had been repressed by Stalin. 
Nonetheless, he broke down into tears when he heard the news. Surprised 
by his own emotional reaction, he thought it was connected to his own 
biography. Many years later he wrote in his memoires: ‘I had spent my 
entire adult life in Stalin’s shadow – I was sixteen when Lenin died in 
1924 – and all my thoughts had been shaped by the presence of Stalin. 
I waited on his words. All my questions were addressed to him, and he 
answered all of them, laconically, precisely, without room for doubt.’ For 
many of Laskin’s age or younger – we just heard he must have been born 
in 1908 – Stalin was a moral reference point. A sort of hidden figure in the 
background of everybody’s lives. Their grief was perhaps a natural reaction 
to the disorientation which they were bound to feel on his death, almost 
regardless of the experience they had undergone in his reign. Although 
probably for the older generation whose views perhaps had been formed at 
an earlier age, before the revolution, the death of Stalin was less likely to 
be a cause for rejoice.
Svetlana Sbitneva was born in 1937 in the Altai region of Siberia. Her 
father had been arrested when she was born and shot shortly afterwards 
in 1938. This family came from Omsk, where they had been active in 
the social-democratic movement before 1917. No less than sixteen of her 
mother’s relatives were arrested in the Great Terror. It shows how some 
families can be affected. All but one of them, Svetlana’s grandmother, were 
either shot by the Bolsheviks or perished in the camps. Svetlana herself, 
who was told very little about her family and who grew up to be a model 
Soviet schoolgirl, like all schoolgirls of course loved Stalin. On the day his 
death was announced she came home from school with black ribbons in 
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her hair. There had been a mourning ceremony at her school, as there were 
in all institutions. The children had decorated Stalin’s portrait with palm 
leaves and white lilies. A semi-Christian veneration of the leader. This 
left her deeply moved. ‘We were all crying’, she recalls, ‘we thought that it 
was the end of the world’. As soon as she got home, Svetlana climbed up 
on the roof of the house where she liked to be alone. There she found her 
grandmother. In an interview Svetlana said about her grandmother: ‘She 
was sitting there crying quietly and crossing herself in a way I had never 
seen before. She saw that I had been crying and said: “Do not worry, dear, 
I am crying from happiness. Because he killed my family: my sons, my 
brothers, my husband, my father.” This was the first time Svetlana had 
been told: ‘Stalin killed them all – leaving only me and your mother.’ ‘That 
was the first time I heard any of this’, said Svetlana, ‘and then the two of 
us sat down and cried together, one from joy, one from grief’.
But in this older generation, and even among dire victims of oppression, 
there were also those who grieved from Stalin’s death. Zinaida Bushueva 
had lost her husband in the Great Terror of 1938. She herself was arrested 
shortly after it, and spent twenty years, first in the ALZhIR labour camp 
for women in Kazakhstan, and then in various administrative exiles – most 
of the time with her three children. Her mother had rescued these children 
from various orphanages, and taken them to be reunited with their mother 
in the camp in Kazakhstan. Zinaida’s daughter Angelina recalls her moth-
er coming home in tears the day she heard that Stalin died: ‘They were all 
crying, my mother and my sister and my grandmother. My grandmother 
said it would have been better if she had died in stead of him. She was 
four years older than Stalin. She loved him. She often wrote to him. She 
believed that it was Stalin who had allowed her to write to her daughter 
[in the labour camp] so that she could reunite the family […]. “It would 
be better if I had died”, my grandmother kept saying. I did not contradict 
her – I loved Stalin too. But today [in 2003] I would say: “Granny, what on 
earth are you saying?” She herself had suffered so much. Her daughter had 
been arrested. Her grandchildren sent to orphanages. Her son-in-law had 
been shot. Even her own husband had been persecuted for being a priest 
[…]. Yet she was prepared to lay down her life to save Stalin.’
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Fear and moral amnesia
Now I think the reaction of Angelina’s grandmother perhaps provides 
some clue in understanding the popular reaction to Stalin’s death, because 
like Angelina’s grandmother many people assumed that Stalin did not 
know about everything that was happening in terms of the mass oppres-
sion. This Russian myth – the Tsar is good, the police are bad, Stalin is 
good, the police are bad, the terror is all being carried out without Stalin’s 
knowledge, and if only Stalin knew everything would be corrected! – was 
a common assumption. That is why so many people like Angelina’s grand-
mother wrote to Stalin saying: please sort this out, my mother, my father, 
my husband – or whoever – is innocent, this is all a dreadful mistake.
That belief in Stalin preserved a basic structure of believe in the system. 
In a way this belief in the system was essential to survive. We carried out 
an interview with someone called Dmitry Streletsky who had a terrible 
family history. He was one of fourteen children in a so-called Gulag family 
sent into administrative exile. He grew up in a labour camp. Dmitry never 
got a proper job until he was in his fifties. He says in an interview that 
at that time he believed in Stalin and he believed in the existence of real 
enemies of the people even though he had been declared one of them. At a 
point where he is trying to reflect analytically, he says: ‘in a way it seems 
weird, but it may make it easier to survive’. This somehow does make 
sense. If you do not believe in the system, if you do not believe that there 
is some logic to the repression of enemies of the people, and if everything 
that you suffer is for nothing, then all you have left is despair.
For the vast majority of the Soviet people Stalin’s death was not a release 
from fear. People assume that Stalin died, and it was all over. That is not 
the case. Fear that Stalin’s death would lead to a new way of mass arrests, 
agitated many families, especially those who had lost relatives in the Ter-
ror. Elga Torchinskaia says: ‘The general reaction in our family was: “what 
will happen next?” We were afraid of the government, we did not know 
what to expect from it, and we were scared that it might retaliate Stalin’s 
death by making more arrests.’
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It seems to me that the first release from fear is the exposure of the Doc-
tors' plot. The Doctors' plot was the most insane of all the waves of terror. 
It came up at the height of a general wave of anti-Semitism in late Stalin’s 
Russia, and was connected to Stalin’s campaign against elements of the 
political police. Stalin basically persecuted phantom Jewish doctors ac-
cused of trying to poison the leadership. The problem was that there were 
no Jewish doctors in the Kremlin. So they had to invent a few who under 
torture confessed they had tried to poison Stalin. The point is that on the 
eve of Stalin’s death it created a mass hysterical wave of fear. People would 
refuse to go to doctors, just in case they were Jewish. Then suddenly Stalin 
died. Within a few days the political police who had taken over the collec-
tive leadership exposed the Doctors' plot for what it was: a complete fab-
rication. This was the first psychological moment when people suddenly 
were released from fear.
For the Torchinsky family – I referred to Elga already – who were a Jewish 
family, the conclusion of the Doctors' plot was a huge relief. They took it 
as proof that all the plots by so-called enemies, were fabrications by the 
state, and that therefore they need not fear new waves of arrest. Released 
from fear Elga herself became confident, and began to speak out against 
people who had bullied her because she was Jewish. She worked as an 
assistant in the ethnographic museum in Leningrad. One of her senior col-
leagues, who was an ardent Stalinist, had written dozens of denunciations 
of Jewish workers in the museum – some of whom had been dismissed 
from their jobs. She knew it was pointless at the time of the Doctors' plot 
to argue with this woman. But after the exposure of the plot she chose to 
confront her, and spoke out in a way that would have sent her possibly 
to the camps before. Elga said: ‘I told her [Maria] that she did not know 
what she was talking about, and that everything she said had been picked 
up from people in food queues […]. Maria began to threaten me: “do you 
know what I can do to you? You shut up!” And then from somewhere, I do 
not know from where, I found the courage to reply: please do not threaten 
me, I am not afraid of you.’ This is obviously with the benefit of hindsight 
for her psychological relief she felt no fear.
Telders Lecture 2009 13
It seems the second and most obvious release from fear is Khrushchev’s 
speech from February 1956. Khrushchev denounced the cult of Stalin and 
exposed the terror within the Bolshevik party of 1937 to 1938 that was 
anti-Leninist, anti-revolutionary. But of course he did not question the 
nature of the Soviet system as a whole. Stalin and one or two other lead-
ers were blamed for everything. The rest of the collective leadership was 
being exonerated. 
One wonders what is the reaction then from this second release from fear? 
Did suddenly everybody speak? Was there suddenly a mass wave of de-
Stalinization? This is certainly the impression we might gain by reading 
the memoires of the intelligentsia, many who immediately sprang to ac-
tion and wrote memoires of the Stalin period and the first period of the 
fall. One of them, Liudmila Alekseyeva, a graduate at Moscow University 
who later joined the dissidents and then emigrated to the USA, wrote in 
the period after 1956: ‘The congress [the Twentieth Party Congress] put 
an end to our lonely questioning of the Soviet system […]. Young men 
and women began to lose their fear of sharing views, information, beliefs, 
questions. Every night we gathered in cramped apartments to recite po-
etry, read “unofficial” prose and swap stories that, taken together, yielded 
a realistic picture of what was going on in our country.’
This is certainly a common view of how it was for the intelligentsia. At 
that moment for ordinary people – not members of the intelligentsia – 
there was too a sense of release after 1956. For instance, for Lydia Babush-
kina whose father had been shot in 1938, Khrushchev’s speech gave some 
sort of official sanction to the feelings of injustice she had harboured since 
her childhood, when her father had disappeared. Before 1956, she was too 
frightened to talk about her feelings, even to her mother and her grand-
mother, who were themselves afraid to talk about the arrest of her father. 
This was mainly due to the fact that they both worked in a munitions fac-
tory, where they might be sacked because of her spoiled biography by the 
fact that this repression was discovered. At times, Lydia said, their silence 
had made her doubt her father’s innocence. After Khrushchev’s speech she 
no longer felt these doubts. At last she had the courage not just to ques-
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tion her mother about who arrested her father for the first time, but also to 
express her views to her fellow workers at the clothing factory where she 
worked. In Smolensk one night in the dormitory attached to the factory 
Lydia told the other girls that Stalin had been the real enemy of the peo-
ple, because he gave orders to arrest innocent citizens like her father. The 
other girls became frightened. ‘Quiet, quiet, they can arrest you for talk 
like that!’, they said. Lydia was not put off and she said: ‘Let them. I will 
tell them loud and clear exactly what Khrushchev said. Let them listen, 
and they will realize that it is the truth.’
It seems that such talk among ordinary people was very exceptional. Even 
after 1956, the vast majority of ordinary people was still too coward and 
frightened by the memory of the Stalinist regime to speak as openly and 
critically as Lydia did. The accepted understanding of the Khrushchev 
thaw as a time of nation wide debate and political questioning, was largely 
shaped by the memoires of the intelligentsia, not being whole representa-
tive. Open talk was possibly the norm among intellectuals who used the 
thaw to grapple with the history of terror. For the mass of the Soviet popu-
lation, who remained confused and ignorant about the forces that shaped 
their lives, stoicism and silence were more common ways for dealing with 
the past. That silence is one that dominates what virtually everyone told 
us about what it is like when relatives return from camps.
After 1956, it was a period when millions of people were returning to their 
families, either from labour camps or cities of administrative exile, with 
people released from camps with minus fifty. This means you cannot live 
in any of the fifty listed cities of the Soviet Union which were the most 
populous. If you came from Moscow, which is number one on the list, and 
you get minus fifty, the most you can do is live a hundred kilometres from 
the centre of Moscow. So families are reunited after relatives return from 
labour camps. It is only after rehabilitation that they return. And families 
try and patch themselves together again. 
What everyone talks about is the silence of returning relatives. People 
were broken physically, but they were also broken mentally. Many of them 
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were frightened about talking. On their relief they signed papers stating 
they will not say what has happened to them in the camps, and many of 
them take this to mean they cannot talk about anything having to do with 
their experience. There was also among many people a fear of re-arrest. 
People literally do live with suitcases packed under their beds in case they 
come again. That fear of re-arrest, many of our people said, continued right 
through to the 1970s and 1980s. In fact, we have had interviews with peo-
ple still dealing with a very high level of fear. One woman Nonna Panova, 
who was 78 at the time of the interview, came from St. Petersburg. She 
talked for a long time and in the first interview, telling her life story, the 
story of her family, she suddenly noticed the microphone on the table. She 
was warned that there was a microphone, that she was being recorded, but 
she had lost herself in the interview. For this woman a microphone was an 
instrument for the KGB. She suddenly became hysterical. She said: ‘O, do 
not arrest me! Do not send me back to Kolyma.’ Some of her relatives had 
been send to Kolyma in Siberia, the worst of the labour camps. I said: ‘Do 
not worry, it is okay’, but she broke of the interview. Only days later she 
came back and said she would like to continue.
So this fear lasts a long time. There was, together with fear among the 
people returning from the camps, a feeling of inferiority, a sense of shame, 
a feeling of their being a stigma. Although people officially received their 
rehabilitation, there is always a little bit of guilt left. Even being cleared 
of the charges for a lack of evidence as your rehabilitation paper would 
say, it does not say ‘you are innocent’. This stigma of oppression people 
continued to carry. It means people continued to be silent. Not just out of 
fear, but in many cases because they were afraid people at home would not 
understand. People would not understand what they had been through. 
How can you understand someone when you do not know what it is like 
to be in a convoy of deportees? This is something which Solzhenitsyn tried 
to communicate in his Gulag Archipelago. No one can really understand 
what it is like, unless they have been there. Many people felt not even their 
family was able to understand what they had been through. More impor-
tantly perhaps they did not want to alienate their children from the Soviet 
system by telling them about the Gulag. Their children had to grow up in 
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the Soviet system, had to make their way. If they told them what they had 
been through, maybe it would have been more difficult for them.
For all these reasons there was silence in families. Zinaida Bushueva who 
had been in a labour camp for women in Kazakhstan and was reunited 
with her children there, never spoke about the camps after she returned. 
She did tell the children about the circumstances of her own arrest and 
the arrest of her husband who was shot in 1938. Even in the last years of 
her life in the late 1980s she would put up defences whenever she was 
questioned about her past. ‘In our family’, recalls her daughter Angelina, 
‘no one talked about the reasons for my mother’s arrest, or why we had 
no father. It was a closed subject. After the Twentieth Party Congress I 
tried to find out more. But Mama would just say: “The less you know, the 
easier you live,” or “The more you know, the quicker you grow old”. She 
had many of these expressions to close the conversation down.’ Accord-
ing to her daughter Zinaida had no interest in politics. She had been quite 
political before. ‘She could not allow herself’, Angelina said. The fear she 
brought back from the camps made her choose a position of uncritical ac-
ceptance of everything she was told by the Soviet regime. Zinaida saw the 
contradictions between propaganda and reality. Although she had directly 
experienced the injustices of the regime, like millions of other ordinary 
citizens she never stopped to reflect critically on the reality she observed. 
Acceptance of Soviet reality was no doubt for her, as it was for millions, a 
coping mechanism, a way to survive.
If we bear in mind the silence – I hesitate to call it ignorance because it 
is not ignorance – if we think about this coping mechanism of survival, 
we begin to understand the lack of reflection on the nature of the Soviet 
system. Then we begin to understand the avoidance of awkward questions 
about the system, and about the repression, especially among the younger 
generation who were protected because they were not told. That, it seems, 
helps us to begin to approach the main theme of this evening’s Telders 
Lecture which is the paradox of victims of oppression feeling nostalgia for 
the Stalinist regime.
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Let us consider the biography of Nadezhda Maksimova. Nadezhda grew 
up completely unaware of her family’s history. Her father, a peasant from 
the Novgorod region, worked as a carpenter in Leningrad. He was arrested 
twice in the 1920s, and was rearrested in 1932 when Nadezhda was only 
three. He was sent to exile with his family in the Arctic’s, where Na-
dezhda grew up oblivious to the reason why they were living in the Arctic 
Circle. Her father was arrested, and in prison briefly, again in 1938 – Na-
dezhda was told he was on a work trip – before the family finally settled in 
Penza. In 1946 Nadezhda enrolled as a student at the Medical Institute in 
Leningrad. She went on to become a physician. It was only short before her 
mother’s death in 1992 that Nadezhda found out about her father’s mul-
tiple arrests and the eight years he spent in various prisons, labour camps 
and special settlements. At the moment of discovery she saw her father’s 
name in the newspaper along with the names of her grandfather and her 
uncle. They were on a list of former political prisoners posthumously re-
habilitated after the collapse of the Soviet regime. Nadezhda showed the 
list to her mother who first said: ‘Oh that is all so long ago, why drag all 
that up again?’ After Nadezhda insisted her mother told her everything. 
Her parents had wanted to protect her by not putting her in a position 
where she would feel obliged to declare her spoiled biography. Every child 
going to an institute of high education was obliged to fill out a question-
naire in which there was a mandated question: has any of your family 
members ever been arrested? ‘Throughout my life’, says Nadezhda, ‘when-
ever I was asked to complete the questionnaire I was able to write “no”, 
and because I did not know about my father, I was able to say that with a 
clear conscience, without any of the anxiety which I would have felt if I 
had been forced to lie. I am sure that is why I always got away with it.’ She 
was genuinely at ease. Her parents had maintained the silence, obviously, 
after 1956. They, despite Khrushchev’s speech, continued to think it was 
too dangerous to tell Nadezhda about the past, in case she told her friends 
or the political circumstances changed. As a consequence, until the age of 
63, Nadezhda, as she herself admits, had little concern for the victims of 
Stalinist repression. This indifference was no doubt shared by other Soviet 
citizens whose lives were unaffected directly by the terror or who perhaps, 
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like Nadezhda, never knew.
Reflecting on her life in the 1930s and 1940s Nadezhda recalls: ‘I had heard 
about the repressions, but they made no impression on me whatsoever. In 
1946, for example, there were mass arrests in the neighbouring village in 
Penza, but somehow they passed me by, I did not understand or even tried 
to understand what was going on […]. Today I find it hard to explain this – 
that these events took place in parallel with my own life, but did not affect 
me in the least. Somehow I managed to avoid it all.’
So this ignorance and silence – as I think you will all begin to understand 
perhaps – worked in complex ways to enforce what I would like to call a 
moral amnesia, a type of political conformity which passes down several 
generations. Children brought up in families who had suffered from trau-
ma pick up on that fear instinctively. They are not told what happened, 
but they pick up codes, behaviour, inhibitions – what some of my inter-
viewers themselves referred to as genetic fear, fear inherited. This creates 
internal barriers.
At the end of our project we began to carry out interviews with particu-
lar cohorts of people born between 1948 and 1956. They were too young 
to have experienced or remember the Stalin years directly, but they were 
brought up by parents who had been repressed and they grew up in the 
age of the dissidents in the late 1960s and 1970s. What we found was very 
interesting. In this generation they all talked about an instinctive fear. 
They had been taught not to question authority. This generation had been 
brought up or had come to understand that they should not talk about cer-
tain things outside their homes. They should not even talk about certain 
things inside their homes. This goes a long way to explain the longevity 
of the Soviet system. I do not think anyone today would argue that the 
Brezhnev regime of the late 60s and 70s, and the early 80s went on out of 
political believe. It went on as a system – people believed in the system, 
the system worked, continued to work – it seems that above all it went 
on because there was no opposition. The dissidents were tiny in number, 
although no doubt millions sympathized with them. But because of this 
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genetic fear, perhaps because of these internal barriers people may sympa-
thize with the dissidents but no longer step over the barrier to join them.
Collective pride
In the Brezhnev era the unofficial memory of Stalin was overlaid by offi-
cial myths. So there was a very interesting phenomenon of people unable 
to make sense of their own experience. They were confused by the trau-
mas they had suffered or their families had undergone, without having a 
political or historical context in which to place those direct experiences. 
In the Soviet myths of the Great Patriotic War or the building of socialism 
they found a collective narrative in which they could place their meaning 
and link their own experience to the experience of millions of others.
Although everybody’s individual experience of Stalinism may be trau-
matic and therefore extraordinary and unique to themselves, in some way 
these collective myths became powerful forces of political mobilization 
and political unity. They enabled people to place their extraordinary indi-
vidual experience in an ordinary context shared by others. No one wants 
to carry through life something of a burden, a suffering which is unique to 
them. They want to give meaning to their suffering in some higher narra-
tive. That was what these official myths, which became very powerful in 
the Brezhnev era, enabled people to do.
The collective memory of the Great Patriotic War was the most potent in 
this respect. It enabled veterans to think of their pain and losses as hav-
ing a larger purpose and meaning. Represented of course by the victory in 
1945, in which they could take pride. My colleague Catherine Merridale 
conducted interviews with veterans in Kursk for her book on the Soviet 
army in the war. She found that these veterans did not reflect on their 
experiences with bitterness or self-pity. They accepted their losses stoi-
cally. Merridale tells: ‘rather than trying to relive the grimmest scenes of 
war, they tended to adopt the language of the vanished Soviet state, talk-
ing about honour and pride, of justified revenge, of motherland, Stalin and 
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the absolute necessity of faith.’ As she explains, this identification with 
the Soviet war myth was a coping mechanism for these veterans, ena-
bling them to live with their painful memories and give them some higher 
meaning. Similarly obviously the people who returned form the labour 
camps often found consolation in Stalin’s idea that this Gulag labouring 
was a contribution to the Soviet economy.
It seems paradoxical, but many of the people who had been in the labour 
camps look back with enormous pride at the factories, dams, and cities 
they built. This pride stems from their continued belief in the Soviet sys-
tem and its ideology despite the injustices they had undergone, and in part 
perhaps from their need to find a larger meaning for their suffering.
We carried out interviews in Norilsk. It is the most awful place on earth 
I have ever seen. It is on the 69th parallel, sees very little sunlight, has a 
temperature of minus 60 degrees, and the toxic atmosphere is such that 
no vegetation can grow there. It is a city entirely populated and colonized 
from the beginning by Gulag workers. The population of 130.000 people 
who continue to live there are all either former prisoners or their de-
cedents. They are all immensely proud of Norilsk. At the first sort of open 
meeting we had with about 30 Norilsk veterans of the labour camp, they 
burst spontaneously into the Norilsk song, saying how people of a special 
type had to be there to survive. Many of them showed up with the medals 
they had won as Gulag workers. They tried to convince us that the place 
was beautiful. They compared it to Leningrad or pointed to buildings built 
by slaves in the centre of Norilsk.
A similar paradox seems to underlie the popularity of Stalin. As suggested 
at the beginning this is a powerful movement particularly among the eld-
erly people. 60% of those aged 60 or older and 42% of the population in 
general would like the return of a leader like Stalin. So Stalin is also popu-
lar among the younger people. Why do younger people like the idea of a 
person like Stalin?
For the older generation this nostalgia seems to be only loosely linked 
Telders Lecture 2009 21
with politics or ideology. For those who recall the Stalin years it has more 
to do with emotions invested in remembrance of the past. They remember 
the legendary period of their youth. When the shops where full of grocer-
ies. When there was social order and security. When their lives were or-
ganized and given meaning by the simple goals of ideal plans. Everything 
was clear in black and white because Stalin did the thinking for them 
and told them what to do. For these people the good old days of Stalin 
perhaps reflect uncertainty of their lives as pensioners particularly since 
the collapse of the Soviet regime in 1991. The rise in prices of many goods 
beyond their means made them feel nostalgic to the old days. The loss of 
their savings by inflation. The rampant criminality that keeps old people 
frightened in their homes. All these factors obviously play a part in their 
feelings of nostalgia.
Those who succumb to this nostalgia were not just those with a certain 
status in the Stalinist system – the vast army of Soviet officials and petty 
functionaries, camp guards, policemen, chauffeurs, and so on, who were 
little Stalins in their own world. It applied also to ordinary citizens – peo-
ple with no special place in the Stalinist regime, but who somehow be-
came entangled in its destiny. It was also not unknown to Stalin’s victims 
and their descendents. We interviewed many of them, Leonid Saltykov for 
example. He was the son of a priest who had been shot in 1938. Leonid 
virtualized conceiving the arrest of his father, as did many who had rela-
tives who had been enemies of the people. He said nothing about his father 
when he became a factory worker and then an engineer. In 1965 Leonid 
joined the party and ended up as secretary of the party committee in the 
factory where he worked. He was a fanatical supporter of Stalin all his life. 
He mourned Stalin’s death, and kept a picture of Stalin on his desk until 
his retirement from the factory in 1993.
During interviews Leonid denied that Stalin was responsible for the mass 
arrests in the 1930s, including the arrest of his father. This is what he 
said: ‘Yes, my father suffered, and so did many others too, but Stalin was 
still better than any of the leaders that we have today’, he is thinking of 
Yeltsin. ‘He [Stalin] was an honest man, even if the people around him 
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were not [...]. Do not forget, thanks to him we won the war, and that is a 
great achievement. If today someone tried to fight a war like that, there 
would be no guarantee that Russia would win it, no guarantee. Stalin built 
our factories and our railways. He brought down the price of bread. He 
spurred us all to work because we knew that if we studied hard, and went 
on to an institute we were guaranteed a good job, and could even choose 
the factory we worked in. Everything depended on how hard you worked.’ 
That sense of hard work gets its rewards. That work, loyalty, gets you a 
place in the system, gets you security is really quite key to this sense of 
nostalgic for the certainties of the Soviet and Stalinist system that you 
find among the older generation.
Many may remember one of the few protests against the Putin regime. It 
was in 2003. Protesters were objecting to the payment of their benefits in 
money. They still wanted their benefits to come as they had come in the 
Soviet days: a basket of goods given to them every month, and subsidized 
rents on their apartments. This is the Soviet place they get for hard work 
and loyalty: they get the security within the system. This was very com-
mon. Listen for example to another victim of repression who is nostalgic 
for Stalin: Iraida Faivisovich. She was four years old and lived with her 
parents who were hairdressers in Osa. They were arrested and both sent to 
the Gulag in 1939. In interviews in 2002 she argued that life had been bet-
ter under Stalin: ‘People did not kill each other in the streets! It was safe 
then to go out at night.’ Like Leonid she believed people in those days were 
honest: ‘Of course, there were sometimes shortages of food or clothes, but 
on the whole they delivered on their promises.’ 
Like many people, Iraida had grown up in a communal apartment – where 
families sometimes even had to share a room, and children were running 
around in the corridors. When you grow up with playmates everywhere in 
the corridor and in the yard, you remember the communal apartments as a 
place of warmth and comradeship. For older people, who fear what people 
might hear in the next room about their conversation, and fear denuncia-
tion by a neighbour, it was not so funny. But for people like Iraida, growing 
up in a communal apartment gave a sense of nostalgia for a time in their 
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lives which was warmer and more spiritual. She says: ‘Life under Stalin 
was spiritually richer – we lived more peacefully and happily. Because we 
were equally poor, we did not place much emphasis on material values 
but had a lot of fun – everything was open, everything was shared between 
friends and families. People helped each other. We lived in each other’s 
rooms, and celebrated holidays with everyone together on the street. To-
day every family lives only for itself.’ For people like Iraida this comrade-
ship is what gave meaning to their lives.
Rehabilitating Stalin
This nostalgia for the Soviet way of life goes a long way to explain the 
politics of the Putin regime, and the return of Stalin’s ghost to Russia in 
the past few years. From the start Putin understood the importance of 
historical rhetoric for his national politics particularly to play the popu-
lar nostalgia for the Soviet Union. The collapse of the Soviet Union was 
a humiliation to most Russians. In a matter of a few months they lost 
everything – an empire, an ideology, an economic system that had given 
them security, superpower status, national pride, and an identity forged 
from Soviet history. Within months they had to beg for relief from the 
West, which lectured them about democracy and human rights. They had 
to confront their past, because after 1991 suddenly the television screens 
and the public media were having discussions about Stalin’s pride. It was 
very much part of the goal of Russian democrats in the 1990s that Russian 
society should confront its past. It was only by confronting this past that 
Russia could democratize.
This was a time when an organization like Memorial was at the height of 
its authority, and often appeared in public media discussions about Stalin’s 
pride. The general message they put across was that it was not just Sta-
lin who was to blame, as Khrushchev had said. They said that there was 
connected responsibility for what had happened under Stalin, and that for 
Russia to renounce the authoritarian past or the authoritarian habits of 
the Soviet past there had to be a genuine cultural and moral reform of the 
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nation. This reform could only start with an unflinching recognition of 
the crimes committed collectively in its name. It was an act of national 
repentance. The real power and lasting legacy of the Stalinist system and 
the structures of Stalin’s power, as Russian historian Mikhail Baitalsky 
once put it ‘was the Stalinism that entered into all of us’. Many Russians 
felt uncomfortable about that. They had been brought up with the Soviet 
myths of the great mission of the Soviet Union: the achievements of So-
viet science and technology, the achievements of five year plans, and the 
victory in the war.
They did not understand why they suddenly had to feel guilty about that 
past. Many Russians felt resentful about being lectured, that this was sud-
denly imposed on them by a regime – the Yeltsin regime – which was basi-
cally turning to the West. They felt that this was somehow a capitulation, 
and above all a humiliation. Perhaps they felt resentful or awkward about 
having to confront this genuinely. People had lived in the Soviet system 
without thinking about uncomfortable questions. They lived their lives 
without questioning their parents, without questioning their bosses, with-
out questioning people in power. That is how they were brought up to live. 
They did not ask discomforting moral questions for themselves. Suddenly, 
they had to confront all these awkward questions about the moral com-
promises they had to make, perhaps the questions they had never asked, 
perhaps the people they had lost, forgotten or renounced. All those ques-
tions were very awkward for people to suddenly face.
Putin understood this as a humiliation for the Russian people. He shared 
the sense that Russia had nothing to apologize for – a nationalism which 
was at the centre of his ideology from the beginning. The restoration of 
something of the Soviet Union, necessarily entailed a change of historical 
politics in the politics of history. From the beginning Putin built up his 
own historical mythology. Combining, if you like, the Soviet myths with 
above all the victory of 1945, but clearly stripped of their communist sym-
bols, their communist packaging. Stalin is not revered as a communist but 
as a national leader. Linking this Soviet heritage with a long continuing of 
statist traditions of authoritarianism in Russia. Going back to the Tsars, 
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right back to Peter the Great, the founder of Putin’s own city St. Peters-
burg. Through this mythology, Putin fostered the idea that Russia’s own 
traditions of authoritarian rule are somehow morally equal to the Western 
democratic tradition, and that Russia will follow its own path of sovereign 
democracy without lectures from the West. Indeed, you often hear his sup-
porters say that Russians value a strong state, economic growth and secu-
rity more than the liberal concepts of human rights and democracy which 
have no roots in Russian history.
The rehabilitation of Stalin is central to this. Stalin features prominently 
now in mass media which are all controlled by the Kremlin. There has 
recently been a television drama Stalin’s life in which an elderly Stalin 
reflects on his achievements in the past and it was all given a very positive 
gloss. And then of course, you might have read in the newspapers about 
it, a poll in which Stalin was voted the third most popular Russian in his-
tory. Interesting that the man who won was Alexander Nevsky, a semi-
mythical figure in Russian medieval history. The Russian producer Sergej 
Eisenstein made a famous film of Nevsky fighting the Teutonic knights 
who fell into the ice. Again, this is the image of the Russian patriotic 
leader who fights the foreigners. 
The point then is not that the regime is trying to deny Stalin’s crimes, but 
that it is trying to emphasize Stalin’s achievements as the builder of the 
country’s glorious Soviet past. The unofficial memory of Stalinism as a 
history of oppression is increasingly pushed to the margins of the national 
consciousness. The regime has been very careful to create this patriotic 
myth of Stalin, of the Soviet system generally as a part of Russian history 
in which Russians can take pride.
At the national conference of high school teachers in Moscow in June 
2007, Putin complained about the mess and confusion he sees in the 
teaching of Soviet history. He called for common standards to be intro-
duced in Russian schools. He wanted a more positive message to be given 
to Russian schoolchildren about their Soviet past. One of the participants, 
a schoolteacher, said during a discussion: ‘In 1990-1991 we disarmed ideo-
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logically. [We adopted] a very uncertain, abstract ideology of human values 
[...]. It is as if we were back in school, or even kindergarten. We were told 
[by the West]: you have rejected communism and are building democracy 
and we will judge when and how you have done.’ And Putin said: ‘Your 
remark about someone who assumes the posture of teacher and begins to 
lecture us is of course absolutely correct. But I would like to add that this, 
undoubtedly, is also an instrument for influencing our country. This is a 
tried and true trick. If someone from the outside is getting ready to grade 
us, this means that he arrogates the right to manage [us] and is keen to 
continue to do so.’ Then the teacher says: ‘O my god, what a confusing 
ideas […]’. And he is not allowed to speak as then Putin interrupts him and 
says about people writing the Western influenced ideas on Soviet history: 
‘Oh, they will write, alright. You see, many textbooks are written by those 
who are paid in foreign grants. And naturally they are dancing the polka 
ordered by those who pay them. Do you understand? And unfortunately 
such textbooks find their way to schools and colleges.’
Four years before there was already a textbook – National History of the 
Twentieth Century for the 10th and 11th Grades – written by Igor Dolut-
sky which was a model of a modern democratic textbook teaching Soviet 
history. It had lots of documents from the archives and invited students 
to ask questions at the end of each chapter and presented different points 
of view. But what Dolutsky did was to compare the victim of oppression 
under Stalin with the system of oppression under Hitler. Because of that, 
the Ministry of Education banned the book which had been used in hun-
dreds of schools.
Four days after the conference, the Duma passed a law giving power to the 
Ministry of Education to decide what textbook should be published and 
what textbook should be used to teach history in Russian schools. I have 
never seen the Duma act so quickly.
I can talk for hours about Russian textbooks, but I need to come to a con-
clusion. I want to tell you about what has happened in the last year – the 
battle over the teaching and presentation of history. At the conference 
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in June 2007, mentioned earlier, the Kremlin began to promote its own 
textbook. In fact, the Minister of Education turned up at the conference 
along with the senior administrator of the presidential administration to 
promote it. It actually turned out that the textbook had been commis-
sioned by the Ministry of Education. Indeed by the president himself, 
Vladimir Putin. Putin had sent out personal instructions to the authors of 
this textbook on how they could present the leaders of the Soviet Union 
and post-Soviet world. It basically went like this: Stalin – good (strength-
ened vertical power, but no private property); Khrushchev – bad (weakened 
vertical power structures); Brezhnev – good (for the same reasons as Sta-
lin); Gorbachev and Yeltsin – bad (destroyed the country, but under Yeltsin 
there was private property); Putin – the greatest leader in Russian history 
(strengthened vertical power structures, with private property). That is the 
view that you will find in a textbook called The Modern History of Russia 
1945-2006: A Teacher’s Handbook which was written by two of the clos-
est advisors on foreign policy and ideology in the Kremlin administration. 
One of them, a man called Pavel Danilin, has no history degree, no experi-
ence in teaching anything. In an interview he made it clear that: ‘Our goal 
is to make the first textbook in which Russian history appears not as a de-
pressing sequence of misfortunes and mistakes but as something to instil 
pride in one’s country. It is in precisely this way that teachers must teach 
history. They should not smear the motherland with mud.’
On his Kremlin-blog (where he goes by the name Leteha) he warned his-
tory teachers – pardon me for my language, Russian administrators are not 
always very polite – that: ‘teachers will be made to teach children by those 
books that you will be given in a way that is needed by Russia. It is impos-
sible to let some Russophobe shit-stinker, or just any amoral type, teach 
Russian history. It is necessary to clear the filth, and if it does not work, 
then clear it by force.’ This is the language of 1937.
The first use of force came on the fourth of December 2008. A group of 
masked men from the investigative committee of the Russian general 
prosecutor’s office forced their way with police strengths in the St. Peters-
burg offices of Memorial which, as you now know, has for twenty years 
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pioneered the research of Stalin’s repression and the Soviet Union. After 
a search they took away on eleven hard drives, the entire archive of St. 
Petersburg Memorial, databases with biographical information of victims 
of repression, details about burial sites in St. Petersburg area, family ar-
chives, recordings and transcripts of interviews including all the materials 
I collected in St. Petersburg for my book The Whisperers. Two days ago 
my Russian publisher cancelled a contract to publish my book in Russian. 
Most sadly of all they took from the St. Petersburg offices of Memorial all 
the materials for what the St. Petersburg division was trying to create, a 
virtual Gulag museum. It may astonish you, but in Russia there is only 
one Gulag museum. It is not big. It is called Perm36, and it is about a three 
hours drive outside of Perm in the Ural. Not many people go there. There 
are about hundred much smaller exhibits, mostly organized by victims of 
oppression themselves, with an artifact from a prison camp, and an old 
document. The idea of the virtual Gulag museum is to put them all on the 
web. But now all that material is gone, and it remains still in the hands of 
the police. 
For me, there is no mistaking the intention of the raid. They tried to con-
nect it with a criminal investigation of an article in a newspaper, but that 
is an absurd charge. For me, the meaning of the raid is in its consequences, 
which is the loss of this archive. Not coincidentally, the raid took place at 
exactly the time when a large conference was being organized in Moscow 
on the history of Stalinism. The biggest conference on such a subject ever 
to take place in Russia. It was organized by Memorial and other organiza-
tions. At the conference all the delegates were given a copy of a special 
issue of a magazine which is run by one of the think tanks of the Kremlin 
called Ruski Journal – the Russian Journal. In it there was a special is-
sue published to coincide with the conference on the politics of memory 
which contained two articles with vicious attacks on Memorial and other 
so-called anti-patriotic elements that had tried to weaken Russia by bur-
dening a sense of guilt over its history. I quote one of these articles: ‘Russia 
has ceased to be sovereign over its own historical memory which is now in 
danger of being taken over foreign inventions.’
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Whatever the intentions of this worrying campaign, it seems to me unre-
alistic that the current regime in Russia will alter the historical records of 
Stalin’s crimes. Too much is now known. But as long as the regime tries 
to suppress the collective memory of repression, and replace it with this 
patriotic myths of the Soviet past in schools and universities, there seems 
to be little hope that Russia will come to terms with its Stalinist inherit-
ance. Then it will not become a genuine democracy, and it will not live in 
peace with itself, with its neighbours, and with the world. For the moment 
all the West can do is to show support for Russian institutions trying to 
preserve the unofficial memory of repression. 
Every year I go to Russia to run a summer school for historians, where 
we try and expose young Russian history teachers to Western techniques 
and ideas, and give them the resources they need to develop new courses 
of history teaching in Russian universities. Perhaps we can do something 
else, it is just a last passing thought: for the past three years Memorial has 
each year been nominated for the Nobel Peace Prize. I think this year it is 
time Memorial won. 
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Outline of the discussion following the Telders Lecture by 
Orlando Figes
After a few words of gratitude towards Orlando Figes for his brilliant and 
provocative speech on the awful history of Soviet Russia and its after-
math, Frits Bolkestein – president of the Telders Foundation – invites the 
public to take part in the discussion.
 
Under Stalin there was without doubt a great deal of terror, much more 
than nowadays, but at least there was less corruption. This might be one 
reason, why Stalin is remembered more positively. Another reason can be 
found in sheer numbers. In his speech, Figes mentioned that under Stalin 
there were 25 million victims of repression, which means that 175 million 
people did not suffer from direct repression. 
 Figes agrees that the corruption might be worse nowadays, but he disa-
grees on the smoothing over of the impact of 25 million victims of repres-
sion. This number of suppressed is only by conservative estimates. In fact 
there were 35 million sentences to the Gulag, but as many people got 
several sentences during Stalin’s regime it is hard to figure out the exact 
number of victims. This is why the actual number of victims is estimated 
on 25 million, which means that one in eight of the Soviet population in 
1940 had been repressed. Statistically, Figes states, this involves virtually 
every family in Soviet Russia in some sort of repression, if not directly 
than through their mother, grandfather, brother etc. This makes it even 
more dazzling that Russian textbooks only mention 3 million sentences. 
Imagine a German textbook in which people could read about 600.000 
people who died in the Holocaust.
How did the Soviets gain control over all Russia? Their bureaucratic ma-
chine seemed to have worked quite well. 
 Although a good answer to this question would take another lecture, 
Figes tries to explain it in short. Many people would say centralized pow-
er did not work, as it does not work in Russia nowadays. The October 
Revolution was based on a mass movement of soviets who had grown 
up in 1917. In the beginning this was a revolution of workers taking over 
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factories and villages being run by peasant committees. They just hap-
pened to call themselves soviets. Soviet doesn’t mean anything Bolshevik, 
it just means council. This trend and these movements became increas-
ingly controlled by the Bolshevik party during the civil war. In the 1920s 
the Bolsheviks had control over parts of the cities, but the countryside 
remained way beyond their real control. There was a lot of opposition in 
the countryside. Stalinism is about crushing independent organizations, 
crushing the village. The collectivisation was a war on the peasants. It was 
not primarily about economic control, but about crushing the village as an 
independent political entity. Stalinism is very much about seizing control 
of the country, and terror was an important and inherent mean to achieve 
that.
Why is the civil war veiled with so many uncertainties? Why did the 
whites loose in 1919, when in fact they were only 100 kilometres away 
from the capital, and they were in so large numbers? 
 Figes explains that he spent quite some time doing research on the 
number of desertions on both sides. Normally, peasants flee from the bat-
tlefield as soon as they have to take care of their harvest, to make sure they 
survive the winter. What happened in October 1919 is remarkable. Large 
numbers of peasants voluntarily came back to fight on the side of the red 
army against the whites. This was not because they only hated the whites; 
on the contrary, they hated both the red and the whites. But they chose the 
side of the reds, because they were afraid that the whites would take away 
their land. Unfortunately for the peasants they helped the Bolsheviks to 
win the civil war. Then followed the massive uprisings in 1920-21, that 
forced the Bolsheviks to retreat.
Asked about the role played by the Russian Orthodox Church in reshaping 
collective memory, Figes explains that the church has mainly been ac-
tive for repressed priests and believers. Besides, the church was concerned 
with the reconstruction of their sacred sites and the church buildings. In 
the beginning the Yeltsin regime tried to separate church and state, but 
already in the late Yeltsin years the Russian Orthodox Church (re)gained 
a privileged position. Although the church has its own victims of oppres-
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sion to lament, it is very compromised by its involvement in the national-
ism of the Putin-regime. It was during this regime that the link between 
church and state grew stronger again, and Putin is very visible as a devout 
orthodox believer.
There is some hope that under influence of Western television and the 
internet the attitude of the Russians towards their national history will 
change. In fact Russian society is opening up, as a growing number of peo-
ple is now connected to the internet which gives them the opportunity 
to learn about Western ideas – also on their own Russian history. More 
Russians also start to travel abroad, which brings them in contact with 
the world outside Russia. There are possibilities enough for Russians to 
revaluate their history, apart from the information they receive in Russia. 
The problem, however, is that young Russians are not interested in history 
at the moment; they just want to make a living.
If you look on the way the continuing of history is represented in the 
public media, you see that there is an authoritarian, statist tradition. This 
is in fact the Russian way with the concept of sovereign democracy. This 
tradition is different from the traditions in the West, but this does not 
necessary have to abide the principles of liberal democracy. In a sovereign 
democracy there are so-called democratic institutions, but meanwhile the 
authoritarian tradition of the state as the main manager of history is pre-
served. The very symbol of this was a poster in the election campaign of 
Russia. On this huge poster was the map of Russia with in its borders pic-
tures of everyone the leaders wanted to claim as part of a positive inherit-
ance Russia could build upon. So there were the faces of Peter the Great, 
Catherine the Great, Alexander Nevsky, Lenin, Putin and also Stalin. This 
was a shock, Figes recalls, it would be like a German election poster with 
Hitler on it as positive part of German history.
Asked whether he can draw something positive from Soviet history, Figes 
admits that he himself once was an optimist in that respect, but not any-
more. After many visits to the country and making many friends with 
Russians in the last twenty-five years, he cannot think of something in the 
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Stalin era we can look at as a positive development. Especially in the last 
six months he never heard so much pessimism from people who other-
wise are optimistic like himself. In his book Natasha’s Dance Figes writes 
about the positive elements in Russian history. These are mainly found 
in the Russian culture, the creative spirit and the endurance of its people, 
but that time unfortunately belongs to the past before the Soviet regime. 
Figes is not so pessimistic as to see the current administration becoming 
fascist in the future. Although the system is corrupt, statist, and succeeds 
in keeping its neighbours weak, Figes cannot imagine that the massive 
waves or terror will return, nor the threatening of large minorities.
In Figes’ opinion the future importance of Russia on the world stage will 
diminish in comparison to the last 60 years. The prospects for the country 
are worrying under the present regime. Although there has been a massive 
exploitation and export of the countries natural resources, there has not 
been much development of high-tech industry or infrastructure. Besides, 
Russia has huge demographic problems, caused by the combination of a 
very low birth rate and an alarmingly high death rate. This mortality is 
very often alcohol related and mainly affecting the male population. Two 
other problems Russia is facing are the brain drain and the flight of capital. 
The current administration finds itself confronted with serious and alarm-
ing concerns for the future. With the enormous promotion of nationalism 
the regime tries to counteract these trends a bit.
Asked about the popularity of Stalin among the non-Russians living in 
Russia, Figes states that the picture is mixed. Some groups like the Geor-
gians – Stalin was born in Georgia – and eastern-Ukrainians have a posi-
tive view of Stalin. On the other hand, groups from Chechnya or the Baltic 
states have a negative view of the dictator. For a large part the identifica-
tion with Stalin is not just a Russian thing, but a Soviet thing. In former 
Soviet states like the Baltics, where the regime is not trying to preserve 
some positive image, you get an entire different picture.
At the end of the evening Figes said that now it would not be possible any-
more to do the project for The Whisperers. Most of the people that were 
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interviewed are now dead and this was the last generation that could speak 
with any authority about their experiences during the Stalin period. But 
the project also could not have been done before. People probably would 
not be prepared to speak to the researchers as they did now, because they 
would feel too frightened with the memory of communism still vivid. 
Notwithstanding all the problems Russians and organisations like Memo-
rial are facing nowadays, Figes expects to continue working in Russia.
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The Telders Foundation was founded in 1954 from a need that was felt 
among liberals for an institute that carries out research on different social 
issues, without being committed to any dogma or religion. Its objective 
and means are, according to the statutes: ‘The Foundation’s objectives are 
to examine in an scientifically responsible way problems of social interest, 
especially those of a political, social, economic, or legal nature, using the 
liberal principles as a basic assumption; to foster research of that sort and 
to give advice about problems of that kind. The foundation aims for this 
objective for the benefit of liberalism in general and also for the benefit of 
the [Dutch liberal party] Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie (VVD). 





De nieuwe economie [The new economy; only available in Dutch]
Frits Bolkestein
Verzwelgt de massacultuur de liberale democratie? [Is mass culture ab-
sorbing liberal democracy?; only available in Dutch]
Johan Norberg
In defence of open borders for immigrants
John Gillingham
Europe at the tipping point
If you want to order one of these Telders Lectures please contact us at 
info@teldersstichting.nl or 0031 (0)70 363 19 48
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Recent publications in English:
 
The dividing line between succes and failure. 
A comparison of liberalism in the Netherlands 
and Germany in the 19th and 20th century, 2006      
  for sale via the bookshop
 
 Separation of Church and State in Europe. With views 
on Norway, Sweden, the Netherlands, Belgium, France,
Spain, Italy, Slovenia and Greece, 2008
   publication with Euro-
pean Liberal  Forum (see: 
www.liberalforum.eu) for 
more information contact 
the Telders Foundation
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De Teldersstichting heeft onder andere de volgende 
geschriften gepubliceerd*:
             Prijs in €
 
94  De EMU effectief. Voorwaarden voor economische 
 dynamiek en financiële degelijkheid, 2003 7,50
95 Belangen in balans. De rol van het nationaal 
 belang in ontwikkelingssamenwerking, 2003  14,00
96   Bureaucratie aan banden. Perspectieven voor een nieuwe 
 dereguleringsoperatie, 2004 14,00 
97  Het Europees constitutioneel verdrag. Getoetst op transparantie, 
 democratie en doelmatigheid, 2005 3,00
98  Liberaal licht op de toekomst, 2005 12,50
99 De grenzen van de open samenleving. Migratie- en 
 integratiebeleid in liberaal perspectief, 2005 15,00
100 Grondrechten gewogen. Enkele constitutionele waarden in 
 het actuele politieke debat, 2006 15,00
101 De radicaal-islamitische ideologie van de 
 Hofstadgroep, 2006 12,00
102 Liberale duurzaamheid. Milieubeleid internationaal 
 bezien, 2007 14,00
103 Vertrouwen in de markt. Naar een liberaal 
 privatiseringsbeleid, 2007
 (uitverkocht, in kopie verkrijgbaar) 12,00
104 Veilige basis voor vrije burgers. Duidelijke liberale
 aanpak van veelvoorkomende criminaliteit, 2008 14,00
105 Rechtsstaat in ontwikkelingslanden? Aspecten van liberale
 ontwikkelingssamenwerking, 2008 15,00
106 Liberaal leiderschap, 2009 8,50
107  Zorgen voor zelfbeschikking. Een liberale visie op de positie van 
de burger in zorg-, woon-, en onderwijsinstellingen, 2009 12,50
* Een volledige lijst met publicaties is op aanvraag verkrijgbaar.
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Verder verscheen recent als bijzondere publicatie:
Aurea libertas. Impressies van vijftig jaar 
Teldersstichting, 2004 17,50
Vrijheidsstreven in verdrukking. Liberale partijpolitiek 
in Nederland 1901-1940, 2005 20,-
Zestig jaar VVD, 2008  
  verkrijgbaar via de boekhandel
Liberale leiders in Europa. Portretten van prominente 
politici uit de negentiende en vroege twintigste eeuw, 2008
 verkrijgbaar via de boekhandel
Architect van onderwijsvernieuwing. Denken en daden
van Gerrit Bolkestein 1971-1956, 2009
 verkrijgbaar via de boekhandel
 
De uitgaven zijn – tenzij anders vermeld – verkrijgbaar door overmak-
ing van het verschuldigde bedrag op girorekening 33.49.769 ten name 
van de Prof.mr. B.M. Telders stichting, Koninginnegracht 55a, 2514 AE 
te Den Haag, onder vermelding van het nummer van het (de) gewenste 
geschrift(en) en/of de titel van het boek.
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Since the year 2000, the Telders Lecture is organized regu-
larly by the Telders Foundation, the think tank that carries 
out research for the benefit of liberalism and the Dutch 
Liberal Party VVD. The purpose of the Telders Lecture is 
to stimulate public debate in the Netherlands by inviting 
a leading scholar or politician to provide us with pro-
found, well-based ideas and insights. The lectures may 
cover a broad spectrum of relevant issues concerning sci-
ence and politics.
The fifth Telders Lecture – organised by European Liberal 
Forum and the Telders Foundation – was given by 
Orlando Figes, professor of history at Birkbeck College, 
University of London. In his lecture Figes elaborates on 
the destruction of individualism by the cruel Soviet 
regime, and its impact on the private lives of citizens 
in Stalin’s Russia, as well as the long aftermath of 
Stalin’s regime. During his dictatorship (from 1928 
until his death) the communist leader Joseph Stalin 
(1879-1953) terrorized the lives of Russians to the 
point where their fear was internalized, and he 
became their moral reference point. Many people 
even believed that Stalin didn’t know about the 
mass oppression, and thought that if he would 
know, he would stop it immediately. Although 
people were filled with fear during his regime, 
their believe in Stalin and his system survived, 
even after his death. 
In modern-day Russia Stalin’s legacy is still 
omnipresent, as can be seen in the growing pres-
sure on liberal constitutionalism and democra-
cy. Putin works hard on the rehabilitation of 
Stalin, not by denying his crimes, but by under-
lining his so-called positive achievements as 
builder of a great and powerful Soviet-Russia.
Stalin’s Ghost:
the Legacies of Soviet History 
and the Future of Russia
Orlando Figes
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